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Few events of recent history have the potential to change the relation-
ship between Americans and their government as much as the budget balancing 
provision known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH). Attached to legislation which 
raised the Federal debt ceiling to $2.079 trillion, GRH carries its sponsors' 
names: Senators Phil Gramm of Texas, Warren Rudman of Vermont - Republicans, 
and Ernest Hollings of South Carolina - Democrat. This article examines GRH 
and its potential immediate and long term impact on agriculture. 
GRH 
GRH is a comprehensive revision of budget procedures, which requires 
elimination of the federal deficit using conventional legislative means or, 
failing that, through automatic spending cuts. The time table for deficit 
reduction is: Fiscal Year (FY) 86: - $172 billion (B), FY87 - $144 B, FY88 
-$108 B, FY89 - $72 B, FY90 - $36 B, and FY91 - $0. 
Unless Congress and the President agree on a budget with a deficit of 
$172 Bin FY86 or one that is within $10 B of the target for FY87 and later, a 
uniform across the board percentage cut in programs, projects, and activities 
is required to meet the target. Half the cuts are in defense spending and 
half in domestic spending. Because FY86 had begun before GRH became law, FY86 
cuts were limited to no more than $11.7 B. 
Certain programs are exempted from the automatic cuts: social security, 
interest on federal debt, veterans' compensation, veterans' pension, Medicaid, 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Women-Infant-Children food program, 
Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, and child nutrition. In addition, 
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medicare, veterans' health, Indian health, and community and migrant health 
centers can be cut no more than 1% in FY86 and no more than 2% thereafter. 
About half the budget LS exempted from automatic cuts and 25 - 30% is in the 
limited cuts category. 
Under GRH, the White House's Office of Budget and Management and the 
Congressional Budget Office submit budget estimates to the Comptroller 
General, who heads the General Accounting Office. If the budget target has 
not been met, the two agencies also submit the estimated cuts required to meet 
the deficit target set by GRH. The Comptroller General verifies the budget 
estimates and cuts. The President then must issue a sequester order which 
implements the automatic cuts reported by the Comptroller General. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Congress realized GRH raised several constitutional questions. Members 
of Congress were authorized to challenge GRH's constitutionality and proce-
dures for expedited judicial review were established. A special three judge 
district court was impaneled in Washington, D.C., with its decision directly 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The major constitutional questions are 
whether Congress delegated legislative powers to the Comptroller General that 
only Congress can exercise and whether GRH conferred on the Comptroller 
General executive powers that may not constitutionally be given to an official 
not removable by the President. 
power" doctrine. 
The latter involves the "separation of 
The district court heard arguments January 10 and ruled February 7 that 
the power of the Comptroller General to order automatic cuts by the President 
was unconstitutional. The Court specifically ruled that, while Congress could 
constitutionally delegate broad powers to cut federal spending to the 
President, it could not delegate them to the Comptroller General because the 
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Comptroller General can not be removed by the President. No other provision 
in GRH was affected by the court ruling. Thus, the deficit targets must still 
be met. 
The Court's ruling did not invalidate an alternative mechanism 
specified by GRH for implementing the automatic cuts. Under this alternative, 
the automatic cuts required by GRH to meet the deficit target would go to a 
special cormnittee comprised of House and Senate budget committee members. It 
would report the sequester order as a joint resolution, which must pass the 
Senate and House and be signed by the President (or passed over the veto). 
Congress could also comply with the special court's objection by amending the 
1921 law that established the Comptroller General to make the office subject 
to removal by the President. The Comptroller General would than be an 
official of the executive branch. Lastly, the special court's ruling hinted 
that the constitutional foundations for many of the powers exercised by 
various independent agencies created by Congress may be questionable. These 
agencies, such as the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission, and 
Federal Connnunication Commission, have substantial influence and power. Such 
a broad judicial interpretation would have significant implications for the 
way government currently works. 
The Supreme Court may or may not agree with the special court's ruling. 
The Supreme Court may also agree with the special court's ruling, but reject 
the special court's basis for reaching its decision and/or the broader 
language in its opinion. 
The special court postponed invalidation of the automatic cuts, pending 
appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, until the Supreme Court decides otherwise, 
the sequester order will become effective March l. Most experts do not 
expect the Supreme Court to rule until after March 1. Assuming the sequester 
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order is implemented March 1, that the Supreme Court rules after March 1, and 
that the rest of GRH is not affected by the Supreme Court's opinion, cuts of 
$11.7 B will still have to be made for FY86. If the already implemented 
sequester order is not reconfirmed by Congress through the alternative 
mechanism, substitute cuts would have to be devised. Such cuts would be 
difficult to achieve and cause havoc with budgets of individual agencies. 
Thus, the potential impact of the constitutional questions on FY86 cuts 
appears minimal at present. 
The impact on FY87 and later budgets is less certain. Many fear invali-
dation of the Comptroller General's role will remove the "club" from the 
bill. Congress and the President will face little pressure to achieve a good 
faith resolution of the deficit problem. On the other hand, a Congress and 
President faced with the possibility of voting on and signing budget cuts (the 
alternative mechanism) which affect some programs while not touching others 
could face intense political pressure to accept an alternative reduction 
package that meets the GRH target. Furthermore, since the FY87 budget 
resolution which establishes overall spending priorities and limits must be 
decided by April 15, much of the debate on the FY87 budget could occur 
before the Supreme Court rules. Thus, the long run impact of the consti-
tutional questions could be minimal. 
In the discussion which follows, it is assumed the Supreme Court's 
decision will be confined to the Comptroller General's role. The rest of GRH 
will remain intact. It is also assumed that, even if the Supreme Court 
invalidates the Comptroller General's role, political pressure will dictate 
that the budget deficit be addressed. 
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IMMEDIATE IMPACT 
Since FY86's estimated deficit is $220.5 B, the President issued February 
1 the $11.7 B sequester order required under GRH. The cuts become effective 
March 1 unless Congress and the President agree on substitute cuts which equal 
or exceed $11.7 B. It is possible Congress and the President could agree on 
substitute cuts, but it is assumed here that the automatic cuts will be 
implemented. 
Under the FY86 sequester order, a 4.3% cut was made in nonexempted 
domestic programs and 4.9% cut in nonexempted military programs. All commer-
cial agriculture programs - price supports, income supports, research, 
extension, soil and water conservation, crop reporting statistics, etc. - are 
nonexempted. USDA's cuts total $1.3 B (second largest of any agency, Defense 
is first). Commodity Credit Corporation, the financing corporation for price 
and income supports, will absorb $824 million in cuts. 
GRH contains a contract sanctity provision. Once a contract, such as 
between a producer and Agricultural and Soil Conservation Service, is signed 
it must be honored. Cuts will be absorbed in the next contract. FY86 funds 
generally pay for 1985 price and income support programs. Because contracts 
have been signed for 1985 programs, a cut in FY86 funds is transferred to 1986 
crop programs. The dairy program is an exception because no contracts are 
involved - CCC purchases milk products in the market place to support the 
price. Thus, except for dairy, the impact on farmers' income from the FY86 
automatic cuts will be delayed. 
USDA will implement the GRH cuts by maintaining target, loan, and 
purchase prices already announced for 1986 commodities but establish payment 
rates equal to 95.7% of these prices. For example, the corn target price of 
$3.03 would become a target payment price of $2.90 (95.7% of $3.03). Maximum 
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deficiency payment would be $0.98 ($2.90 -$1.92) instead of $1.11. Using this 
approach, the corn loan payment rate would be $1.84; wheat target payment 
price, $4.19; wheat loan payment rate, $2.30; and milk support payment price, 
$11.10 per hundredweight. 
The bottom line for agriculture is fewer government services after March 
1 and lower government payments for milk and 1986 crops. Furthermore, given 
the surplus production capacity, the 4.3% cut in price and income supports 
will probably translate into a 4.3% reduction in farm receipts for program 
commodities. 
FY87 AND BEYOND 
Looking beyond FY86, GRH should be viewed as both a policy statement and 
a budget reduction mechanism. The policy is that the federal deficit will be 
reduced, if not eliminated, and spending cuts will achieve part of the 
reduction. The key questions become how large will the spending cuts be and 
how will they be made. 
REVENUE ENHANCEMENT 
Size of the cuts will depend on the growth in revenue from existing 
sources over the next five years, the imposition of new taxes, and increased 
revenue from other sources such as an oil import fee or additional user taxes. 
An example of the latter is President Reagan's proposal in his FY87 budget to 
increase the share of federal inspection and marketing costs paid by stock-
yards, grain companies, and others. Specifically, of the proposed federal 
expenditures of $832 million in FY87, $582 million are proposed to come from 
user fees. These figures compare with FY86 figures of $142 mil 1 ion in user 
fees out of $714 million in expenditures. 
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Another source of increased revenue and/or reduced federal expenditures 
is "privatization." This involves transferring services now provided by the 
public sector to the private sector, such as mass transportation, and/or 
selling government assets to the private sector. Examples of the latter in 
President Reagan's budget include Washington National Airport, federal 
transmission and power generation facilities (federal ownership and control of 
the associated dams are retained), and naval petroleum reserves. 
Growth in revenue from existing sources will depend on how fast the 
economy grows. An important question is what will be the impact of reduced 
government spending. Many economists worry the potential reductions are so 
large they will push the economy into a recession. It should be noted the 
automatic cuts under GRH would be suspended in a recession. At the least, 
unless the Federal Reserve Board develops an appropriate monetary policy, 
slower economic growth because of reduced federal spending or increased taxes 
implies smaller government revenues and larger deficits. Any reduction in 
the rate of increase of future revenue from existing sources in turn implies 
that the spending cuts necessary to achieve an FY91 deficit of zero could be 
larger than si:aply eliminating the FY87 deficit. There is also the unknown 
impact on economic growth of any change in the tax laws, whether they be 
revenue neutral or enhancing. 
Increased taxes remain the big unknown. At present, conventional 
political wisdom is that Americans will not support tax increases. Will that 
sentiment hold as budget cuts impact their lifestyle? Whatever the answer, 
the desire for shrinking government spending appears strong and broad based. 
Thus, the largest politically acceptable revenue increase at present appears 
to be a one-for-one tradeoff: each dollar reduction in federal spending 
matched by a dollar increase in revenue. 
-8-
BUDGET CUTS SCENARIOS 
One scenario is that all cuts will occur through the automatic mechanism 
in GRH, whether implemented by the Comptroller General, the alternative 
special budget committee, or some substitute procedure. Recent estimates by 
the Office of Budget and Management suggest a FY87 deficit of around $180 B if 
FY86 programs are extended and adjusted for inflation and increases in number 
of people eligible for current entitlement programs (the so-called FY87 
current services budget). Thus, a cut of around $36 B would be required to 
achieve the $144 B deficit target. This translates into approximately a 15% 
automatic cut in nonexempted domestic programs beginning October 1, 1986. To 
achieve a FY91 deficit of zero, recent budget evidence suggests automatic cuts 
totaling 40-60% over FY87-91. An important question for FY87 will be whether 
cuts for farm income support programs will be additive to FY86 cuts since the 
Farm Bill freezes target prices at 1985 program levels for 1987 crops. 
Political considerations suggest that the general public will not permit 
deep cuts in some programs, such as guaranteed student loans, soil and water 
conservation, and mass transportation, while no cuts are made in other 
programs. These considerations argue that the horizontal cuts of GRH will be 
broadened to include most, if not all, nonexempted and limited cut programs. 
The President's recent budget forecasts $846 Bin FY87 expenditures, 
excluding interest on the debt. Debt expenditure can not be cut because it is 
determined in the bond market, not by the government. Spreading $36 B in cuts 
over $846 B in expenditures yields a 4.2% cut. Over FY87-91, cuts would total 
$180 B or 19.4% of the President's forecasted annual spending of $926 B over 
this period (excluding forecasted interest expense). To the extent programs 
are exempted or limited in the size of the cuts, these percentages would 
increase for the remaining programs. 
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As the impacts of the cuts on the American lifestyle become apparent, 
political considerations suggest that the one-for-one revenue scenario dis-
cussed above will become increasingly likely. This scenario yields across the 
board cuts in all programs of 2.1% in FY87 and 9.7% through FY91. Further-
more, in addition to horizontal cuts, Congress and the President will likely 
implement vertical cuts. These will eliminate entire programs. For example, 
in his FY87 budget President Reagan proposed eliminating subsidies for Federal 
Crop Insurance over five years and immediately stopping direct financial 
assistance to farmers for soil and water conservation measures (technical 
assistance will be continued). 
OTHER IMPACTS 
The least discussed aspect of GRH are the many important changes in 
congressional budget rules. Some are designed to insure the budget process is 
finished by October 1, the beginning of a new fiscal year. For example, 
Congress must complete action on budget reconciliation by June 15. Recon-
ciliation establishes overall spending limits for Congressional committees. 
Previously, Congress was required to complete action on reconciliation by 
September 25. It should be noted that Congress routinely missed this deadline. 
Other rule changes allow a member of Congress to raise new points of 
order on legislation that requests spending authority in excess of budget 
targets and resolutions. Unless a point of order is overruled by the pre-
siding officer or is voided by at least a three-fifth vote, the legislation 
is declared out of order and barred from further discussion. The new points 
of order, in conjunction with the greater emphasis being given to budget 
matters in general, portend a shift of power among Congressional committees. 
Specifically, the House and Senate budget committees are likely to gain power 
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at the expense of authorization and appropriation committees, including the 
House and Senate agriculture committees and agriculture appropriation subcom-
mittees. 
This shift will affect agricultural legislation primarily through budget 
reconciliation. Reconciliation involves the instruction to committees on how 
much spending for programs under their jurisdiction is to be cut so as to 
comply with overall budget targets. These instructions can not dictate the 
cuts, but they do contain suggestions on how the cuts should be made. These 
suggestions are debated in Congress as if they were policy decisions although 
they are recognized as non-binding. The impact of reconciliation on agri-
cultural legislation has already been felt. The shift from direct lending by 
Farmers Home Administration to guaranteed loans contained in the 1985 Farm 
Bill was in essence decided by the FY86 Congressional Budget Resolution, which 
passed the end of July 1985. 
A second implication is that, if the earlier time table for budget 
legislation is adhered to, Congressional work on the 1990 Farm Bill may have 
to begin in 1989 instead of 1990 as it traditionally would. The earlier start 
reflects the need to make the authorizing bill consistent with the recon-
ciliation instructions for FY91. Otherwise, the authorizing (i.e., agri-
culture) committees could lose some control over farm policy. 
A third ill.plication is that, with the emergence of the budget committees 
as an agricultural political center, agricultural lobbying efforts will have 
to include not only the agriculture committees and agriculture appropriations 
subcommittees but also the budget committees. Furthermore, assuming the 
budget committees continue to work without subcommittees, agriculture will 
have to justify its agenda within the national agenda of the budget commit-
tees, specifically the budget. 
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A fourth implication is that the Farm Credit System Act of 1985 appropri-
ated no money for the potential relief of the Farm Credit System (FCS). Many 
experts expect FCS to need government aid within the next two years. The 
stricter budget points of order make it more difficult to enact appropri-
ations for new programs. The points of order could be used to require that, 
in order to remain within the budget constraints for agriculture, spending for 
other agricultural programs would have to be reduced to offset appropriations 
for FCS. This possibility raises some potentially critical questions. Most 
importantly, if farm price and income supports are cut to make room for FCS 
relief, the number and degree of farmers in stress would increase, adding to 
the stress on lenders. Note, this offset requirement for funding new programs 
could potentially apply to any new program. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, political considerations and economic reality suggest that 
balancing the budget will probably involve a combination of horizontal and 
vertical spending cuts as well as revenue enhancement. Spending for all 
agriculture programs will likely decline and some will be eliminated. However, 
agriculture is unlikely to absorb a disproportion share of spending cuts. A 
reasonable guess based on the above discussion is a reduction of 10-20% in 
FY86 agricultural spending levels by FY92 in addition to the decline in farm 
program spending resulting from implementation of the 1985 Farm Bill. Thus, 
fewer government services will be provided to agriculture. 
Another reasonable guess is that, compared with the 1985 Farm Bill, cash 
receipts for program commodities over the next six years could average 2-4% 
lower per year because of GRH. One direct implication is that land prices 
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will be further pressured, increasing financial stress on farmers and farm 
lenders. Using Ohio State University's crop enterprise budgets and a 3% real 
interest rate, a 3% drop in cash receipts would mean $40-60 lower land prices. 
In the long term, it is changes in the rules of the House and Senate 
which may have the greatest impact on the relationship between government and 
agriculture. These rules change the way Congress conducts its business. At 
the least, agriculture will increasingly have to justify its agenda within the 
national priority to reduce the budget. 
